When Prayer Requires Proof: Maharashtra’s Anti-Conversion Law and Freedom of Conscience
Maharashtra’s new anti-conversion law seeks to prevent coercion and fraud, but its broad regulatory framework risks placing prayer, religious association and freedom of conscience under a cloud of suspicion.

Published on: 14 September 2026, 03:55 am
THE REPORTED DECISION of some churches in Maharashtra to obtain written declarations from worshippers affirming that they attended prayer meetings voluntarily reflects more than legal caution. It exposes a larger constitutional tension on whether the State can prevent coercive or fraudulent conversion without making every religious choice appear suspect.
The Maharashtra Freedom of Religion Act, 2026, which came into force on August 28, 2026, prohibits conversion through force, coercion, deceit, misrepresentation, threats, undue influence, inducement and fraudulent means. It also establishes procedures for proposed conversions, including prior notice and post-conversion declarations. The State plainly has a legitimate interest in protecting people from fraud, coercion and exploitation. The Supreme Court recognised this principle in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977), holding that Article 25 does not create a fundamental right to convert another person through force or fraud.
That principle, however, does not resolve every constitutional question. The crucial distinction is between the unlawful method by which a conversion may be secured and the individual’s voluntary decision to change faith pursued by them. Article 25 begins with the “freedom of conscience”. Those words place the individual, not the State or a religious institution, at the centre of the constitutional guarantee.
What the law regulates
The Act adopts a broad definition of “unlawful conversion”. It covers not only force and deception but also allurement, undue influence, fraudulent means and “brainwashing through the medium of education or by any other such means”. “Allurement” includes gifts, material benefits, employment, free education in institutions run by religious bodies, promises of marriage, a “better lifestyle”, divine healing, and portraying or glorifying one religion over another.
Section 3 prohibits conversion or attempted conversion through these means and extends liability to assistance, abetment and conspiracy. A conversion contrary to the Act is treated as an offence and declared void. Section 6 requires the proposed convert and the person or institution organising the ceremony to provide 60 days’ prior notice to the competent authority (District Magistrate). The proposed conversion may then be publicly displayed, objections may be invited and a police inquiry may examine its intention, purpose or cause.
Section 7 requires post-conversion declarations within 21 days, containing extensive personal details, including the person’s name, age, address, parents’ and spouse’s names, previous and new religions, and the date, place and manner of conversion. Non-compliance renders the conversion void under the Act. The offences are cognisable and non-bailable, triable by a Court of Sessions. Section 13 also places the burden of establishing that the conversion was lawful on the person who caused it and anyone who aided or abetted it.
These provisions warrant careful constitutional scrutiny, not because the State lacks power to prevent unlawful conduct, but because the regulatory framework enters a domain closely connected to privacy, dignity, and personal autonomy.
Prayer is not conversion
The reported decision of some churches and prayer groups in Maharashtra to obtain written declarations from worshippers affirming that their attendance is voluntary is significant not because such declarations conclusively establish anything about conversion, but because they reveal the behavioural consequences of a broad and potentially coercive regulatory framework. The constitutional concern therefore extends beyond the narrow question whether attendance at a prayer meeting can legally amount to conversion. The deeper question is what happens to religious freedom when religious institutions begin to reorganise their ordinary practices primarily to protect themselves against the possibility of being accused under a statute by the provisions of which criminal cases can be filed.
A person may attend a service out of curiosity, friendship, intellectual interest, personal faith or a desire to pray. Listening to a sermon or reading religious literature does not necessarily mean that a person has renounced one religion and adopted another. A Hindu attending a church service has not automatically become a Christian; a Christian visiting a temple has not necessarily become a Hindu; and a Muslim attending a Buddhist meditation programme has not thereby changed faith.