The Supreme Court’s Practice-Training-Clerkship Regime for Entry-Level State Judicial Service: Reform in Haste, Repent at Leisure?
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Bhumika Trust, which dilutes the three-year Bar practice rule with a new training-clerkship regime, overestimates institutional readiness, introduces an additional layer of uncertainty and subjective assessment for judicial aspirants, sidelines litigant interests, and further erodes the autonomy of High Courts and states over judicial recruitment.

Published on: 5 September 2026, 10:52 am
THE SUPREME COURT’S latest ruling, Bhumika Trust v. Union of India (2026), dilutes the three-year practice rule by revisiting its earlier ruling: All India Judges Association v. Union of India (AIJA 2025). The bench comprised Justice Surya Kant, Justice Augustine Masih, and Justice Vinod Chandran, with the latter two having also been part of the three-judge bench that reinstated the three-year practice requirement last year. The majority, comprising Justice Kant and Justice Masih, reiterated that three years of prior practice at the Bar remains mandatory, but proposed alternative modalities for satisfying the practice requirement. Justice Chandran, by contrast, declined to revisit the rule, holding that there was no scope for reviewing AIJA 2025.
This piece critiques Bhumika Trust primarily on four grounds. First, the mandated two-year period of pre-induction training and clerkship disincentivises judicial aspirants on several counts. Second, the insistence on structured judicial training and clerkship rests on the assumption that state judicial academies and the respective High Courts are adequately equipped to facilitate both components, an assumption that does not withstand even the preliminary scrutiny. Third, the reform lacks a litigant-centric orientation: it places disproportionate emphasis on the challenges that the three-year practice requirement poses for women, weaker sections, and other vulnerable groups, while overlooking the reform’s implications for timely recruitment of judicial officers to subordinate courts. Fourth, the ruling rests on perception-driven policy assumptions, and reflects a continued disregard for the autonomy of High Courts and state governments in matters of judicial service. Before developing these objections, however, it is necessary first to understand the implications of the majority view.
The ruling reduces the required period of practice at the Bar to one year; however, aspirants must furnish evidence of this one year of practice at the time of application, in accordance with AIJA 2025. Upon successful completion of the recruitment hurdles (written examination and viva voce), the “Trainee Judicial Officers” must undergo one year of “intensive” training at the state judicial academy. Upon completing the training, the trainee judicial officer should undertake a six-month clerkship with a District Judge, followed by a further six-month clerkship with a sitting High Court judge. On completion of the clerkship, the trainee judicial officer shall submit a reasoned report, obtained from the mentor High Court Judge, evaluating the trainee's performance and suitability. Only when the High Court Judge finds the performance of the trainee judge “satisfactory”, he/she will be formally appointed to a judicial office. During the training and clerkship, trainee judicial officers are entitled to half of the salary payable to a Judicial Magistrate First Class in that state. They become entitled to the regular pay scale and other service benefits only upon appointment to a judicial office.
The training-clerkship regime as a deterrent to entry
While most states have dedicated judicial academies, their capacities vary significantly, and not all are equipped to deliver intensive, year-long judicial training. Notwithstanding the recommendations of the Shetty Commission, directions issued by the Supreme Court in AIJA 2002 and relevant recruitment rules, the average duration of pre-induction hovers between 4 and 7 months in most state academies. While many academies follow a staggered, phased pre-induction training, partly to cope with resource constraints.
In light of the limited faculty and administrative support, most academies would struggle to reorient their training pedagogy and rework their calendars. A year-long training programme would also require High Courts to depute additional in-service judges to support the state judicial academies. In sum, implementing Bhumika Trust will carry significant financial, administrative, and governance implications for state judicial academies. More pertinently, given the well-documented shortcomings of the judicial training these academies currently deliver, an impact assessment of their programmes across states is long overdue and should precede any expansion of their mandate.