‘Discredited in its entirety’ – How the Delhi Liquor Policy scam case finally fell apart
In its 598 page judgment delivered last week, which discharged Arvind Kejriwal and 22 other accused, a Delhi court ruled that the evidence did not inspire “grave suspicion”, failing to make a prima facie case.
Published on: 5 March 2026, 04:41 am
ON FEBRUARY 27, 2026, the Court of Shri Jitendra Singh, Special Judge (PC Act) (CBI), (MP/MLAs Cases), Rouse Avenue Court, passed an order discharging all 23 accused persons in the Delhi Excise Policy scam case, including Delhi’s former chief minister Arvind Kejriwal. The case was under CBI’s investigation, which had filed five chargesheets, including a main chargesheet and four supplementary chargesheets.
However, the Special Judge found that the evidence adduced in the chargesheets did not inspire “grave suspicion” against the accused, hence failing to establish a prima facie case.
‘If there is suspicion, but not grave suspicion, Court is empowered to discharge accused’
Relying on the law laid by the Supreme Court in Tuhin Kumar Bishwas @ Bumba v. State of West Bengal (2025) the Special Judge emphasised that a strong suspicion must be based on material capable of becoming evidence, absent which an accused can be discharged.
The order was passed at the stage of framing charges under Sections 227/228 of the erstwhile Criminal Procedure Code. While Section 228 of the Code provided the procedure for the “framing of charges”, Section 227 provided for “discharge”. The Section states that if, upon considering the record of the case and the evidence presented therewith, and after hearing the accused and the prosecution, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasoning for doing so.
To put this in context, the hearing at this stage is only a preliminary hearing, and the arguments presented by the parties are merely opening arguments. The court is, at this stage, not required to undertake a detailed evaluation of the evidence or to test its probative value. The occasion for that comes later, when the trial begins. At this stage, the court is only required to determine whether a prima facie case to proceed with the trial is made out, based on the material presented before it.
The case was under CBI’s investigation, which had filed four chargesheets, including a main chargesheet and four supplementary chargesheets.
The Special Judge has stated that since cross-examination and defence rebuttal are not part of this stage, the Court proceeds on the premise that the prosecution material is prima facie true and uncontroverted. However, while following Sajjan Kumar v. Bureau of Investigation (2010), the leading judgment of the Supreme Court on the scope of Sections 227 and 228, the Judge clarified that the law did not require the Court to act as merely a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution. Rather, it required it to apply its judicial mind to the record to assess whether the material, taken at face value, discloses the essential ingredients of the alleged offence and raise grave suspicion, as distinct from a mere suspicion.
Citing other precedents of the Supreme Court, the Judge further clarified that “ground” under Section 227 of the CrPC is not a ground for conviction, but rather a ground for putting the accused on trial. And if two views are possible, one of which gives rise only to suspicion rather than grave suspicion, the Court is empowered to discharge the accused without proceeding with the trial.