ICJ’s 'Right to Strike' Advisory Opinion: Are ‘Relevant Rules of International Law’ relevant?
In its advisory opinion last month, the International Court of Justice augmented the right to strike to a core labour right under Convention 87. Its reliance on ‘relevant rules of international law’ in the ruling is a positive step towards bringing international law under a more unified system.
Published on: 24 June 2026, 01:27 pm
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (‘ICJ’) rendered its advisory opinion on Right to Strike under ILO Convention No. 87 on May 21, 2026. The Court, by ten votes to four, observed that “the right to strike of workers and their organisations is protected under the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87).” Legally, the opinion augments the right to strike to the status of a human right and customary international law. In a developing State like India, the opinion can have far-reaching implications, with the Courts often referring to international labour standards.
The ICJ’s Right to Strike advisory opinion has transformed an implicit right into a core labour right under Convention No. 87, and also enhances the leverage of the labour unions. As academics Justina Uriburu and Julian Arato put it, “the opinion is arrived at the moment when the right-wing government have made attempts to erode labour rights.” It also fuels tension between international and domestic norms, where the right to strike is legal but regulated.
The opinion brought to the forefront crucial pressure points in international law by redefining the notion of consent in advisory opinions. By using the tool of treaty interpretation, the ICJ transcended State consent to such a high status that several judges had to contradict the majority view. This was apparent from the two declarations, four separate and dissenting opinions that were rendered in this judgment.
The ICJ applied the ‘relevant rules of international law’ to elevate the right to strike as part of freedom of association. However, the Court failed to clearly justify the binding nature of ‘relevant rules of international law'. Therefore, Judges regarded it as being detrimental to State consent and contradicting subsequent practice under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969 (‘VCLT’).
This essay attempts to defend the Court's application of ‘relevant rules of international law’ under Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT. I conclude that ‘relevant rules of international law’ has the potential to unite international law as a unified system in response to fragmentation.
As academics Justina Uriburu and Julian Arato put it, “the opinion is arrived at the moment when the right-wing government have made attempts to erode labour rights.”