How to revisit the human angle in data driven space governance

A RECENT ACADEMIC PAPER IN ACTA ASTRONAUTICA, “The protection of AI-based space systems from a data-driven governance perspective,” authored by Giovanni Tricco and eleven others attempts to tackle a complex and timely topic: how our existing legal frameworks must adapt to be more autonomous, when it comes to AI-enabled satellites and spacecraft. Their work is welcome academic development on data collection, cybersecurity, and IP issues at the crossroads of space technology and law. 

The paper appreciates that AI will revolutionise space missions and underscores the need for legal imperatives. However, while the authors chart useful technical and legal terrain, their view(s) is largely technocratic and optimistic. In doing so, they overlook some hard realities. In particular, the study skirts the national-security and diplomatic fault-lines that data-sharing can possibly unlock, glosses over what norms and objectives must truly guide AI-governance, and stops short of practical prescriptions for AI-specific threats. 

Below I highlight these gaps, and then suggest a missing ingredient: a “protocol of protocols” anchoring human oversight in any AI-space regimen.

Data sharing’s political shadow

The paper rightly praises international cooperation – joint Mars missions, open Earth-observation data, and shared satellite platforms – as engines of scientific progress and trust. But this narrative stands incomplete. In reality, outer space sits not only in the realm of collaboration but also of great power rivalry. Military and intelligence applications of AI-driven satellites raise political and security stakes that the paper almost entirely ignores. For example, real-time high-resolution imagery from AI-enabled Earth-observation satellites can be intelligence gold. The U.S., Russia, China, and others carefully guard much of this data. 

Satellite communications and GPS technology have clear dual-use character: they can serve civilian needs or be repurposed for military command and control. Yet the paper’s discussion of data sharing treats it as an unambiguous good. It elides the fact that states often restrict data exchange for national-security reasons. What do diplomatic tensions over space data look like? The authors do not say.

Equally, there is little attention to the diplomatic dimension of data standards. Who sets the rules for sharing? 

For instance, if the EU or the U.S. demand high cybersecurity protocols, but Russia or China insist on sovereignty over their AI systems’ data, how will this friction be resolved? The paper hints at international cooperation but never wrestles with the banal mistrust that often underlies it. A robust critique would note that any proposal for data-driven governance in space must acknowledge that states view satellites as strategic assets. Without diplomatic groundwork, even the most sophisticated legal mechanisms may not yield result due to the political unwillingness towards sharing sensitive information. In short, analysis should balance rosy semblance scenarios of global commons against the very real possibility of geopolitical gridlock. Tricco and others stop short of this balance, which is a notable omission.

Legal clarity and normative vision

Closely tied to data diplomacy is the need for clear laws and shared objectives. Tricco and others point to existing space treaties (like the Outer Space Treaty), and call for international collaboration and perhaps new frameworks. The paper urges ethical principles – fairness, transparency, privacy – as guiding stars. But these remain broad slogans. Missing from the paper is a discussion of which core values society should prioritise in this domain.